The development of the law on sexual harassment at the workplace in India has never been merely statutory, it has always been constitutional in character. The enactment of the POSH Act, 2013 marked the formalisation of principles first articulated in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241, but it did not, and could not, reduce those principles into rigid textual compartments. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1415, though arising from a jurisdictional challenge, offers important guidance on the interpretative approach to be adopted while construing the provisions of the Act.
At its core, the judgment reaffirms that the POSH Act must be read not in fragments, but as a coherent statutory scheme informed by its purpose, context, and constitutional foundation.
Text, Context, and the Limits of Literalism
The Court begins with settled principles of statutory interpretation. While the text of the statute remains the primary guide, it must be read in light of its context and purpose. As reiterated with reference to RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424, statutory interpretation must harmonise the “text” and the “context”, each informing the other.
This approach becomes central to the Court’s treatment of Section 11 of the POSH Act. The argument before the Court sought to read the expression “where the respondent is an employee” as imposing a jurisdictional limitation, namely, that only the Internal Committee at the respondent’s workplace could conduct the inquiry.
Rejecting this construction, the Court undertakes a close textual and contextual analysis. It holds that the expression “where” is used as a conditional conjunction, denoting a situation rather than a place, and therefore does not prescribe territorial jurisdiction.
Section 11, properly construed, is thus a procedural provision, it governs the manner of inquiry (i.e., application of service rules or prescribed procedure), and does not restrict the forum before which a complaint may be entertained.
Purposive Interpretation and the Character of the Statute
The Court then proceeds to situate the POSH Act within its legislative and constitutional context. The Preamble itself recognises that sexual harassment is a violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
In this backdrop, the Court emphasises that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation, and must be interpreted accordingly. Reliance is placed on principles articulated in Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133, to reiterate that purposive construction is particularly warranted where legislation seeks to remedy a social evil.
The Court cautions that any interpretation which defeats the object of the Act or renders its protections illusory must be avoided. In particular, a construction that creates barriers to access, procedural, logistical, or psychological would be inconsistent with the legislative intent.
Findings on Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Scheme of the Act
The principal holding of the Court may be stated with clarity:
- The Internal Committee constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint, even where the respondent is employed in a different department or establishment.
- The phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 does not impose a jurisdictional limitation, but merely governs the procedure to be followed in conducting the inquiry.
- The definition of “respondent” under Section 2(m) refers to “a person” against whom a complaint is made, and does not require that such person be employed at the same workplace as the aggrieved woman.
- The expansive definition of “workplace” under Section 2(o), including any place visited in the course of employment, reinforces that the Act is not confined to traditional or co-located employment settings.
- Section 19(h), which contemplates initiation of criminal proceedings, does not exclude or limit recourse under the POSH Act; it operates as an additional safeguard.
In rejecting the appellant’s contention, the Court affirms that the statutory mechanism is designed to ensure that a complaint may be effectively pursued at the workplace of the aggrieved woman, without being contingent on the employment location of the respondent.
Strengthening Protection Under the POSH Framework
The judgment significantly strengthens the protective framework of the POSH Act in several respects:
- Accessibility of the Redressal Mechanism
By affirming the jurisdiction of the Internal Committee at the complainant’s workplace, the Court ensures that the statutory remedy remains accessible and immediate. The aggrieved woman is not compelled to navigate unfamiliar institutional settings or pursue remedies in distant workplaces.
- Removal of Procedural Barriers
The Court expressly recognises that requiring complaints to be filed at the respondent’s workplace would create practical and psychological obstacles, particularly in cases involving sensitive allegations. The rejection of such a construction preserves the usability of the mechanism.
- Recognition of Workplace Realities
By relying on the expanded definition of “workplace”, the judgment acknowledges that professional interactions extend beyond physical offices. This ensures that protection is not defeated by the mobility and fluidity of modern employment structures.
- Preservation of the Remedial Character of the Act
The Court’s refusal to read procedural provisions as jurisdictional limitations ensures that the POSH Act continues to operate as a remedial statute, rather than being reduced to a technical framework vulnerable to procedural defeat.
- Harmonisation with Disciplinary Frameworks
While recognising that disciplinary action must ultimately be taken by the respondent’s employer under applicable service rules (Section 13), the Court clarifies that this does not affect the competence of the Internal Committee at the complainant’s workplace to conduct the inquiry. This preserves both institutional coherence and complainant-centric access.
Procedure and Jurisdiction: A Necessary Distinction
A critical contribution of the judgment lies in maintaining the distinction between procedure and jurisdiction. Section 11 governs how an inquiry is to be conducted; it does not determine where it must be initiated.
By declining to conflate the two, the Court avoids a construction that would allow procedural language to defeat substantive rights. This approach ensures that the statutory framework remains workable and effective.
Conclusion
Sohail Malik v. Union of India is a reaffirmation of interpretative discipline in the context of a social welfare statute. It underscores that the POSH Act must be construed in a manner that advances its object, namely, the protection of dignity, equality, and safety at the workplace.
The judgment strengthens the statutory framework by ensuring that access to redressal remains with the aggrieved woman, rather than being displaced by formalistic considerations of the respondent’s employment.
In doing so, the Court has reinforced a principle that lies at the heart of the POSH regime: that the law must operate in a manner that is not only legally sound, but also practically meaningful for those it seeks to protect.